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BORROWING FROM BLACKACRE:
EXPANDING TRIBAL LAND BASES THROUGH
THE CREATION OF FUTURE INTERESTS
AND JOINT TENANCIES
STACY L. LEEDS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a companion article entitled The Burning of Blackacre: A Step
Toward Reclaiming Tribal Property Law,' I encouraged tribal governments
to reject certain aspects of the Anglo-American property regime, and
2
to the contemporary land
instead, look to tribal property laws for solutions
3
country.
Indian
plague
that
tenure problems
I suggested that tribal attorneys concentrate on reviving traditional
tribal property laws, rather than relying wholesale on the property 4 law
lessons learned in the property law courses at American law schools. A
revitalization of tribal property law, I concluded, would prove particularly
helpful in addressing problems of fractionated ownership throughout Indian

'Associate Professor of Law and Director, Tribal Law and Government Center, University of
Kansas School of Law; Justice, Cherokee Nation JAT (Supreme Court). The author would like to
thank the editorial board and staff of the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW and Professor Matthew
Fletcher for the invitation to participate in this publication.
1. Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming Tribal Property
Law, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2001).
2. Id. at 495-96. The tribal property laws at issue in the Burning of Blackacre were various
property laws enacted by the Cherokee Nation between 1808 and 1898 and less formal customary
laws that mirror their codified counterparts. Id.
3. For a discussion of contemporary land tenure problems throughout Indian country, see
generally Jessica A. Shoemaker, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation,and the
Indian Land Tenure Problem, (2003) Wisc. L. REV. 729 (2003); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995); Mary Christine Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of
Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1474-75 (1994);
Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595 (2000); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment:
Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001).
4. Several other commentators have suggested a shift away from Anglo-American law and a
revitalization of tribal laws in other substantive areas. See generally Carole E. Goldberg,
Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 889 (2003); Christine Zuni Cruz,
On the Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 229 (2000); G. William Rice, Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country
Lawyer on Crime, Jurisprudence, and the Tribal Attorney's Role in Developing Tribal
Sovereignty, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31 (1997); and Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal
Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys
Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1997).
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country.5 In essence, a traditional tribal property law scheme would
provide better solutions for dealing with the legacy of forced land
allotment.
In discussing the detrimental legacy of allotment, 6 The Burning of
Blackacre addressed one of the many problems plaguing tribal land tenure:
highly fractionated property interests. 7 This article will discuss another
issue of importance to tribes: the diminishing tribal land base inside Indian
country.8 In contrast to the initial article, which rejected Anglo-American
property laws in favor of tribal law, this article encourages tribes to utilize
the Anglo-American legal tools to the tribes' advantage in restoring the
tribal land base. Thus, instead of conceptually setting fire to the estate of
Blackacre,9 this article borrows from Blackacre's traditions.
Part two of this article describes the devastating effect of the federal
allotment policy on two fronts: (1) the loss of tribal land base within Indian
country and (2) the destruction of local tribal economies. Part three
proposes a plan for tribal governments to re-acquire non-Indian owned fee
lands within their territories by the creation of future interests and joint
tenancies. 10 Part four details how tribal economies will be revived after the
5. Indian country is a legal term of art that will be used through the article to represent both a
political and a territorial tribal jurisdictional area which is conceptually broader than the typical
"reservation." "Indian country" is statutorily defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151
as "(a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government ... (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same." The term Indian country originated for use in
determining federal criminal jurisdiction and has also been utilized in delineated civil jurisdiction.
DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). But see Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001) ("Section 1151 simply does not address an Indian tribe's
inherent or retained sovereignty over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land.")
6. The "legacy of allotment" throughout this article refers to the negative consequences of
the federal allotment policy. Professor Judith Royster authored the seminal piece on the allotment
process from which the phrase is attributed. See generally Royster, supra note 4.
7. Fractionated property interests result from multiple co-owners having fractional interest in
land. The allotment process has led to most Indian lands having dozens of owners. See JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY, 712-14 (2001). The problem of fractionated
ownership, although prolific throughout Indian country, is also prevalent in other communities of
color, particularly in the rural south.
Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to
Deconstruction: Undermining Black Land Ownership, Political Independence, and Community
Through PartitionSales of Tenancies in Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 505 (2001).
8. The proposals set forth in this article are geographically limited in scope to lands located
within Indian country, although tribes may wish to employ similar methods for expanding land
bases outside of their current territorial or political boundaries.
9. The term Blackacre is a fictitious estate in land, used in legal discourse, particularly in first
year law school hypotheticals in property law. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A
Fragment,94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2171 (1985).
10. Although the proposal would be equally successive if applied to fee lands owned by
tribal citizens, this article does not encourage tribes to acquire fee lands from its citizenry. It is
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tribe reacquires property interests from non-Indian owners. Part five
concludes by charging tribes to consider these proposals together with the
previous proposals in The Burning of Blackacre.
II. THE ALLOTMENT PROCESS
1
The federal allotment policy of the late nineteenth century, ' which
converted the tribal land base into small parcels of individually-owned
2
property, has rendered most tribal economies unviable.' The effects of the
allotment policy, although long criticized, continue to limit economic
development for both private endeavors of individual Indians and
sustainability of tribal economies.
to
The allotment policy, as a social experiment, was designed
3 The
society.1
American
assimilate individual Indians into mainstream
allotment policy, as an economic experiment, was designed to transform
individual Indians into capitalists who would put their privately-owned
14
lands to more efficient use, with an eye toward full self-sufficiency.

important for tribal communities to have private rights to property and private economic
that
enterprise, just as they did during the pre-allotment period. For suggestions on ensuring
Indian fee remains in Indian ownership, see generally Leeds, supra note 2.
119,
11. The General Allotment Act of 1887 set the federal allotment policy in motion. Ch.
to as the
24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381 (1887)) (also referred
Dawes Act, for the sponsor of the legislation).
It is important to note that allotment was often effectuated through tribal-specific legislation
size of
based on agreements between the federal government and the various tribes. Thus, the
taxation differ
allotments, the restrictions on alienation, and the periods of exemption from state
Act of June
from tribe to tribe. The Atoka Agreement with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes,
to remain
28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (ratified August 24, 1898) (stating lands were
Under
nontaxable while title remained with the original allottee for a period of twenty-one years).
years. 24
the General Allotment Act, lands were to be held in trust for a period of twenty-five
for general
Stat. 389 (25 U.S.C. § 348 (1887)). See also Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912)
taxation.
state
to
exemptions
discussion of allotment
available
12. One of the most commonly cited problems within Indian country is the lack of
Ownership
financing due to lands being held in trust after allotment. John McGee Ingram, Home
164-65 (1998)
Opportunities in Indian Country, 7 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 164,
is only a
(discussing barriers to home ownership). "Economic development on many reservations
is the culprit."
dream, individuals can't find capital for investments in business-and trust land
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, available at
David Melmer, Economics of Trust Land Ownership,
0 964 056 5
(Mar. 18, 2005). See also Carl G.
1
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfmid=1
Remedies, 73
Hakansson, Allotment at Pine Ridge Reservation: Its Consequences and Alternative
Predicamentof
N.D. L. REV. 231, 233-52 (1997); L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The
Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 718-19 (2001).
or
13. Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism
Socialism Succeed? 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 812 (2001).
economic
14. See id. at 814. 1 suggest throughout this article that there were both social and
economic selfreasons for allotment. A secondary goal of the allotment process is to increase
policy's
sufficiency among Indian people. Most commentators have focused on the allotment
goals to civilize and Christianize Indians en route to American citizenship.
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IGNORING INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Proponents of allotment convinced Congress that Indians did not
understand or value individual property rights.15 Allotment, they believed,
would ideally teach Indians the importance of individual property rights to
better prepare them for American citizenship.16 Although a growing
number of contemporary scholars have refuted the notion of tribal
communal ownership by providing evidence of extensive private property
rights at tribal law, the federal government simply disregarded the existence
of tribal property laws in effect at the time of allotment. 17 The federal
government also ignored the opposition of Indian people who were content
with tribal property law regimes.18 In doing so, the rights of the individual
Indians, which were otherwise protected under tribal law, were ignored to
make way for the forced allotment of tribal lands. 19 Sometimes, the forced
allotment actually reduced the land holdings of individual Indians, as
15. Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1567-68.
16. See generally id.
17. Id. at 1571-72.
18. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 667-68 (1912) (noting the Dawes Commission found
many Indians were opposed to allotment); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 433 (1994) ("Indians
were overwhelmingly opposed to allotments.") As the Hagen Court noted, after almost a week of
negotiations, only 82 of 280 adult Ute men would agree to allotment. Id. The same opposition is
evidenced in Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
19. In fact, it was not just tribal property laws that were ignored in the allotment process.
The federal government ignored previous fee patents and their own treaty guarantees to allow for
forced allotment of lands. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902). The Cherokee
lands that were allotted had previously been conveyed to the tribe in fee simple absolute, not
subject to any federal trust oversight. Id. at 298. The language of conveyance in the deed reads,
Therefore, in execution of the agreements and stipulations contained in the said
several treaties, the United States have given and granted, and by these presents do
give and grant, unto the said Cherokee Nation the two tracts of land so surveyed and
hereinbefore described, containing in the whole fourteen millions, three hundred and
seventy-four thousand, one hundred and thirty-five acres, and fourteen-hundredths of
an acre, to have and to hold the same, together with all the rights,privileges, and
appurtenances thereto belonging to the said Cherokee Nation forever; subject,
however, to the right of the United States to permit other tribes of red men to get salt
on the salt plain on the western prairie referred to in the second article of the treaty of
the twenty-ninth of December, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, which salt
plain has been ascertained to be within the limits prescribed for the outlet agreed to be
granted by said article, and subject also to all the other rights reserved to the United
States, in and by the articles hereinbefore recited, to the extent and in the manner in
which the said rights are so reserved; and subject also to the condition provided by the
act of Congress of the twenty-eighth of May, one thousand eight hundred and thirty,
referred to in the above-recited third article, and which condition is, that the lands
hereby granted shall revert to the United States if the said Cherokee Nation becomes
extinct or abandons the same.
Id. (conveying lands to the Cherokee Nation on December 31, 1838) (emphasis added). The only
restrictions contained in the deed is a permissive right in the form of a license to access salt plains
and a reversionary interest in the United States shall the Cherokee Nation become extinct or
abandon its property claims. Id. at 298.
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evidenced by the testimony of an Indian farmer who lost substantial land
holdings as a result of allotment:
Under our old Cherokee regime I spent the early days of my life on
the farm up here of 300 acres, and arranged to be comfortable in
my old age ....

When I was assigned to that 60 acres, and I could

take no more under the inexorable law of allotment enforced upon
us Cherokees, I had to relinquish every inch of my premises
outside of that little 60 acres .... What am I going to do with it?
For the last few years ... I have gone out there on that farm day
I have exerted all my ability, all industry, all my
after day ...
intelligence ... to make my living out of that 60 acres, and, God
be my judge, I have not been able to do it. . . . I am here to-day

[sic], a poor man upon the verge of starvation-my muscular
energy gone, hope gone. I have nothing to charge my calamity to
but the unwise legislation of Congress in reference to my
Cherokee people. 20
Once an individual allotment was conveyed to the allottee, the land was
then governed by Anglo-American law, most often the laws of the
21
surrounding state.
In addition to highly fractionated estates, the allotment process resulted
22
in a catastrophic loss in tribal land base. Estimates suggest that by 1934,
the allotment process resulted in the loss of 86 million acres of Indian20. D.W.C. Duncan, How Allotment Impoverishes the Indians: Testimony Before a Senate
Comm. Investigating Conditions in the Indian Territory, November 1906, in GREAT DOCUMENTS
IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 287-88 (Wayne Moquin & Charles Van Doren eds., 1973), also
cited in Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1603.
21. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1887). Federal legislation extends state intestacy laws into Indian
country to govern inheritance of restricted trust allotments. Richard A. Monette, Governing
Private Property in Indian Country: The Double Edged Sword of the Trust Relationship and
Trust ResponsibilityArising out of Early Supreme Court Opinions and the General Allotment Act,
25 N.M. L. REV. 35, 40 (1995) (detailing the problem of applying state laws inside Indian country
and aptly noting that the General Allotment Act provides for the application of state law, not state
jurisdiction). See also Jeffrey S. Kinster, Native American Restricted Allotments: A Surviving
Spouse's Elective Share Rights, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263, 268-71 (1993) (discussing state law
applicability in testamentary disposal of allotments and in intestate succession).
Congress has attempted to remedy further fractionation of Indian allotment by proposing that
certain small interest escheat to the tribe at death of a co-owner, but the legislation has failed as an
impermissible taking of property interests without just compensation. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 707 (1987); Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1997); Note, Babbit v. Youpee:
Allotment and the Continuing Loss of Native American Property and the Right to Devise, 19 HAW.
L. REV. 265, 271-74 (1997).
22. Royster, supra note 4, at 6. Professor Judith Royster has characterized the allotment
policy as "the greatest and most concerted attack on territorial sovereignty of the Indian tribes."
Id. (citing FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-79 (Rennard Strickland
ed. 1982)). Professor Bobroff aptly notes that allotment was "an unquestionable disaster." See
Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1559.
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owned land.23 Other estimates suggest that by the end of the allotment era,
two-thirds of all the land allotted passed into non-Indian ownership.24
B.

IGNORING TRIBAL ECONOMIES

In addition to overlooking or ignoring tribal property laws in the push
for allotment, the federal government also ignored the existence of tribal
economies. Proponents of allotment argued that Indians would be more
self-sufficient if they became private property owners because, without
private property, there was no incentive for economic progress. 25 What the
allotment proponents ignored, was the fact that many tribal communities
were already self-sufficient, with growing economies, at the time the lands
were allotted.26
These allotment proponents presupposed that all tribal economies were
non-existent, or at best, severely depressed. Undoubtedly there were some
tribal communities that were nearing starvation, just as there were
economically depressed non-Indian communities at the time. But some
tribal communities had successful local economies that were destroyed by
allotment: "Before this allotment scheme was put in effect in the Cherokee

23. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES
IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 20 (1987).
Professor Royster reports similar

figures, estimating that 27 million acres were lost from lands allotted to Indian people and another
60 million acres lost as a result of the surplus lands acts. Royster, supra note 4, at 12-13.
24. See Royster, supra note 4, at 12; Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1561.
25. Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters' Last Stand:
American Indian Women's Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Property Rights,
77 N.C. L. REv. 637, 675 (January 1999) (stating,
The Commissioner explained in 1888 that "the degrading communism of the tribalreservation system gives to the individual no incentive to labor, but puts a premium
upon idleness and makes it fashionable. Under this system, the laziest man owns as
much as the most industrious man." Allotment was to replace the Indian's
"communism" with selfishness: "[H]e must be imbued with
the exalting egotism of
American civilization, so that he will say 'I' instead of 'We,' and 'This is mine,'
instead of 'This is ours."')
26. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L.REV. 1559, 1605 (May 2001)
The Council of the Seneca Nation of New York Indians sent a memorial to Congress
opposing allotment: Under the present system by which the Senecas, with a
constitutional form of government, regulate and control all their own affairs, they are
rapidly improving in their social condition. Agriculture flourishes, the houses and
farms of the Indians are constantly improving, the people are contented and
prosperous, and there are no paupers to be a burden on the community. Many have
cattle, horses, and crops in abundance ....
[Tihis condition of independence and
prosperity is largely due to the system by which the lands are owned in common,
controlled by the national councils, and are permanently inalienable.
(quoting House of Representatives Executive Document No. 83,47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882)).
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Nation we were a prosperous people. We had farms[,] .

. .

. Orchards and

gardens- everything that promoted the comforts of private life ....
One would expect that Indian people opposing allotment would
exaggerate the economic successes of their pre-allotment communities, but
one would suspect the advocates of allotment to provide a more damning
description of tribal economic conditions. This was simply not the case.
Even the Senator who sponsored the General Allotment Act recognized the
28
existence of sustainable tribal economies in the pre-allotment period.
After a trip to the Cherokee Nation, Senator Dawes of Massachusetts noted,
The head chief told us that there was not a family in that whole
nation that had not a home of its own. There was not a pauper in
that nation, and the Nation did not owe a dollar. It built its own
capitol and it built its schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect of
the system was apparent. They have gone as far as they can go,
because they own their land in common.., and under that there is
no enterprise to make your home any better than that of your
neighbors. There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of
civilization. Till this people will consent to give up their lands,
and divide them among their citizens so that each can own the land
29
he cultivates, they will not make much more progress.
I quote Senator Dawes, not to suggest a flawless Cherokee preallotment utopia, but to highlight the irony of the allotment process: the
allotment process was founded on the notion that if Indians would embrace
individual ownership in land, they would enjoy a better economic
condition. 30 As a direct result of allotment, individual Indian ownership is
virtually non-existent and Indian tribes are more economically dependant
today than at the time of allotment.
In the Cherokee Nation, as in other tribal communities, the federal
government ignored that the Cherokees already had enforceable individual
property rights and a successful tribal economy. The tribe was 100% selfsufficient and debt free. 31 One hundred years later, only a small percentage
of the land allotted to Cherokee Indians remains in Cherokee hands, and
likely not a single parcel of restricted Indian land is individually owned
property, but instead, encumbered with multiple co-owners of fractional

27. Duncan, supra note 21, at 287-88; Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1603.
28. PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE
OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIANS 43 (1886); see also Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1565.
29. Bobroff, supra note 4, at 1564.

30. Id.
31. Id.
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interest. Rather than the vibrant economic condition hoped for in the
allotment myth, the Cherokee Nation is now reliant on the federal
government for over ninety percent of their annual budget.32 Regardless of
the condition of a tribe's pre-allotment economy or pattern of individual
property rights, one thing is clear: not only was the allotment era a failure of
social engineering and property law, but it was responsible for the
destruction of tribal economies.
C.

LASTING EFFECTS

Today, throughout Indian country, multiple co-owners share fractional
property interests in single parcels of allotted lands. The lands, if held in
trust by the federal government, are inalienable due to federal restrictions. 33
The lands, if held in fee by the Indian co-tenants, become de facto
inalienable because they are unmarketable and lack the capacity to be put to
efficient economic use. 34 Banks and other investors will seldom lend
money on lands with multiple Indian co-tenants each owning small
fractional property interests. 35 And with each successive generation,
through intestate succession or inheritance through wills,

36

the number of

32. Cherokee Nation Principal Chief Chad Smith Re-Election Campaign, Cherokee Nation
Today (2003), at http://www.chadsmith.com/impact.htm (last visited June 14, 2005).
Cherokee Nation operates on a budget of more than $200 million a year. Eighty-three
percent of the budget is federally funded and appropriated to more than one hundred
different programs and services on behalf of Cherokee citizens. Seventeen percent of
the budget is Tribally generated and goes to the General Fund for the operation of
Cherokee Nation government.
Id. " Up to 90 percent of our budget comes from the federal government." The Cherokee Nation,
Website of Tribal Council Member William G. Johnson, District 8 (2005), at http://
www.cherokee.org/TribalGovemment/CouncilPage.asp?ID=17&Name--Council2003 (last visited
June 14, 2005).
33. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) presently administers 45.6 million acres of triballyowned land; individually-owned trust land administered by the BIA constitutes 10 million acres.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Mission Statement, at http://www.doiu.nbc.gov/orientation/bia2.cfm
(last visited June 14, 2005); see also generally H.R. Rep. No. 108-195 (2004) (regarding
appropriations for the Department of Interior).
34. See generally Ingram, supra note 13 (discussing trust land inalienability and lack of
market value comparables as barriers to obtaining traditional financing).
35. Id; see also John Fredericks III, Indian Lands: Financing Indian Agriculture:
Mortgaged Indian Lands and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105
(1989).
36. The Indian land title and probate cases present a multitude of procedural problems for
attorneys practicing in the field. Sharon J. Bell, Indian Title Problems: A Survival Primer, PROP.
& PROB., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 30 (noting that it often takes several years to resolve ownership
questions on allotted lands; for instance, it took thirty-five years of litigation to resolve ownership
of surface and mineral rights in the case Fife v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1951)).
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co-tenants increases and the individual property interests become more
fractured.

37

The federal policy called for allotted lands to be held in trust by the
federal government, or for the allotments to be otherwise protected against
alienation. 38 The trust period typically lasted twenty-five years, or until an
individual Indian was deemed competent to hold fee title. 39 Lands held in
trust or restricted status are not subject to state taxation or other forms of
regulatory authority.4 0
When a parcel of land loses trust status or becomes unrestricted, the
Indian allottee becomes the owner in fee simple absolute.4 1 Fee title gives
the individual allottee the same rights as any other fee title owner, but
subjects the land to state regulatory powers, including the exercise of
eminent domain. 42 Fee land can also be acquired through adverse
possession. 43 But most importantly, as the primary barrier to tribal
economic development, fee lands inside Indian country are subject to state
taxation.44

37. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987). The United States Supreme Court, in Hodel
v. Irving, provided the oft-cited example of fractionate interested problem of one famous Indian
allotment:
Tract 1305 is 40 acres and produces $1,080 in income annually. It is valued at $8,000.
It has 439 owners, one-third of whom receive less than $.05 in annual rent and twoThe common denominator used to
thirds of whom receive less than $1.00 ....
compute fractional interests in the property is [3 trillion, 294 billion, 923 million, 840
The administrative
thousand]. The smallest heir receives $.01 every 177 years ....
costs of handling this tract are estimated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560
annually.
Id.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2000).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See SINGER, supra note 8, at 134. The doctrine of adverse possession allows a trespasser
who occupies the lands of another and treats the property as their own to effectively oust the true
title holder. Id.; see generally Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse
Possession, 15 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 161 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122 (1984).
44. Burke Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 149, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349);
County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (permitting state taxation of
allotment owned by Indians in fee). Robert Porter has noted that the realities of state taxation in
Indian country place tribal attorneys in a difficult advisory position when the tribe wants to
embrace a territorial approach to Indian taxation. Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of
American Law to the Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1622 (2004); but see In re Kansas
Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 738 (1806) (holding state taxation of lands in severalty by individual Indians
was not subject to state taxation); In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 771 (1866) (holding state
tax was premature when Indians still possessed property).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:827

State taxation has devastated tribal economies. 45 When states impose
property taxes on Indian-owned allotments, it precludes the tribes' ability to
establish its own tax base, 46 and Indian lands become susceptible to
forfeiture. When both tribes and states impose a business activities tax on
lands within Indian country, it discourages private business enterprise in
areas that are already economically deprived.47 And finally, when states
impose sales taxes or income taxes on activities that take place on Indianowned lands, it effectively shuts down any hope of a burgeoning private
tribal economy because the individual business owners become subject to
the tax powers of all three sovereigns. 48 In short, the allotment process,
which was the catalyst for state regulatory intrusions, has converted Indian
country into a cash economy with little or no hope of economic
revitalization. The only way to truly revive tribal economies is to restore
and increase the tribal land base and stop state taxation within Indian
country.
There are typically two ways tribes can restore or expand the tribal land
base. They can depend on the will of Congress to return former land
holdings, 49 or tribes can repurchase lands lost to allotment. 50 Congress has

45. Larry Echohawk, Balancing State and Tribal Power to Tax in Indian County, 40 IDAHO
L. REV. 623, 624 (2004) (stating that the imposition of state taxes "cripple[s] reservation
economies" and using the Ft. Hall Indian reservation as an example).
46. Arguably, the tribes retain the power to tax lands owned in fee by tribal citizens within
the tribe's territorial and political jurisdiction. However, if a tribe imposed a tax on its members
who are already forced to pay state taxes, it would exasperate the economic conditions of its
citizenry and perhaps contribute to the loss of land association with forced tax sales.
47. See Echohawk, supra note 46, at 351.
48. James M. Burson, Note, The Blaze Construction Case: An Analysis of the Blaze
Construction Tax Cases and the Implications of Avoidance of Taxation in Indian Country, 39
NAT. RESOURCES J. 845, 876 (1999) (noting that as a practical matter, the Court has foreclosed
any chances of the tribe luring business on-reservation).
49. Raymand Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian
Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARtz. L. REV. 425, 434 (1998). The federal courts have
long recognized the so-called "plenary power" of Congress over Indian people and their lands.
Lonewolf v. Hitchock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (allowing the allotment of Indian lands without
tribal consent and in violation of treaty provisions). South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 343 (1998) ("Congress possesses plenary power of Indian Affairs, including the power
to modify or eliminate tribal rights.") (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
(1978)).
If Congress has the power to modify or take away tribal rights to land, it also has the power to
restore tribal land bases. Congress exercised this power in Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, paving the way for the present land-into-trust regulation discussion. See infra, Part
VI.
50. United States Department of Interior, Strengthening the Circle: Interior Indian Affairs
Highlights 2001-2004 16, available at http://www.doi.gov/accomplishments/bia-report.pdf
("Purchase of fractional interests increases the likelihood of more productive economic use of the
land, reduces record keeping and large numbers of small-dollar financial transactions, and
decreases the number of interests subject to probate."). GARY A. SOKOLOW, NATIVE AMERICANS
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delegated limited power to the Secretary of the Interior to assist in the
restoration of tribal land bases through various land-into-trust provisions.5 1
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193452 initially authorized the Secretary
to take lands into trust for tribes 53 for the purpose of restoring tribal land
bases and promoting tribal self-sufficiency. 5 4 The most common scenario
occurs when a tribe acquires fee title to lands within their territorial
jurisdiction and then petitions the Secretary to extend trust status to the
lands.55
Once trust status is extended to lands acquired by the tribe in fee, the
lands become inalienable, and most importantly, free from state taxation,
eminent domain and adverse possession. 56 Trust status ensures that the
lands are within tribal jurisdiction and most importantly, free from the reach
58
of the state. 57 The down-side to trust status is increased federal oversight,
including a requirement that the federal government approve any type of
conveyance, including leases for business and agricultural purposes. 59

AND THE LAW 231 (2000) ("There exists a procedure in federal law to transfer such land from
trust status to deeded status.").
51. See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Craig A. Jacobson, Indian Tribes and the Base
Realignment and Closure Act: Recommendations for Future Trust Land Acquisitions, 75 N.D. L.
REV. 509,524 (1999).
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-495 (2000).
53. Id. § 465.
54. The authority of the Secretary to take lands into trust has been challenged under the nondelegation doctrine. United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 199) (rejecting delegation
argument and noting that congressional delegation for trust acquisitions was appropriate).
55. 25 C.F.R. § 151 (2005) governs trust acquisitions by the Secretary of the Interior. The
Secretary has the authority to take lands in trust status for individual Indians and tribes. § 151.1.
56. Trust status refers to land in which the title is "held in trust by the United States." id. §
151.2(d). Restricted land, in contrast, refers to land in which the title is held by an individual
Indian or a tribe with a restriction on alienation. Id. § 151.2(e).
57. Id.
58. E.g., Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2002). Individual tribal
members who hold Individual Indian Money accounts administered by the federal government
seek an historical accounting of their own trust funds. See id.
59. The requirement that the federal government consent to conveyances of Indian land has
deep historical roots to the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts. Act of July 23, 1790, 1 Stat. 137;
Act of March 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 329; Act of March 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 743 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (2000)). Under the Acts, all purchases, leases, and other types of conveyance from
Indian tribes required consent of the United States because the Acts' overriding purpose was to
ensure that only the United States could acquire Indian title while preventing alienation of Indian
lands by states or private parties. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscurora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,
119(1960).
Because Indian lands are inalienable, except to the federal government or with the federal
government's consent, the United States has been considered an indispensable party to state
condemnation proceedings where Indian lands are involved. Further, an express removal of
restriction is necessary before state eminent domain powers may be exercised on such lands.
United States v. City of McAlester, 604 F.2d 42, 45-46 (10th Cir. 1979); Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations v. City of Atoka, 207 F.2d 763, 766-67 (10th Cir. 1953). See also United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1926).
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Tribes who wish to purchase lands or acquire property interests are free
to do so, just as any private citizen or private entity may do. The problem is
obvious. Tribes need money to repurchase land and property values are
increasing. Land values will continue to rise, but the need for tribal land
base will never diminish. Tribes realize the practical need to purchase lands
as soon as possible. But, relying on,luck to find affordable real estate
acquisitions, such as forced tax sales foreclosures, will not yield the volume
of land that the tribes seek.
III. THE PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF FUTURE INTERESTS
At the time lands were allotted it was presumed that, "within a
generation or two ...the tribes would dissolve, their reservations would
disappear ... ."60 The proposal set forth in this article offers a means to
return many non-Indian owned fee lands within Indian country to tribal
ownership, within a single generation. The proposal borrows from AngloAmerican property law by creating future interests in land. Future interests
have been a cornerstone of Anglo-American property law dating back to the
fourteenth century. 6 1 Future interest rules allow property ownership to be
divided over time, with one entity having a right to current possession and
another having the right to possession at a later date. 62
This proposal is the first of its kind, in that it instructs tribes to create
for themselves, a future interest in land. Some commentators have briefly

60. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 336 (1998).
For similar
pronouncements, see also Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984).
61. See generally T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interest, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 513
(2003).
62. See Singer, supra note 8, at 290. There are several types of future interest. "Perhaps the
best known example is the leasehold; the tenant has the right to present possession and the
landlord has the right to regain possession at the end of the lease." Id. Other future interests
include reversions, rights of re-entry, possibility of reverter, remainders, and executory interests.
See id.
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addressed future interests in other Indian law contexts, 63 but none have
advocated for the tribal government to take an active role. 64
A.

CREATION OF REMAINDER OR REVERSION IN TRIBE

A future interest in property will become possessory at a future point in
time. An owner of a future interest has no present right to possess the land,
but still owns a valid property interest. A vested remainder is a future
interest that follows a life estate.
For example, consider the following scenario: The proverbial
Blackacre estate is currently owned by "Owen." Suppose Owen would like
to sell his estate Blackacre to his friend Amy, but he dislikes Amy's
children. Owen wants to make sure that when Amy dies, the Blackacre
goes to his friend Bill. Owen executes a deed that states: "I hereby convey
Blackacre to Amy for her natural life, remainder to my dear friend Bill and
his heirs."
At the time of this conveyance, Amy acquires a life estate. As the
holder of a life estate, Amy has a present possessory interest in Blackacre.
She has the right to possess and use the property as she sees fit, as long as

she lives. She can lease her interest, sell her interest, or chose not to make
use of the land.
At the time of the conveyance, Bill acquires a future interest in
Blackacre. When Amy dies, Bill will have full rights to the land. But, at
the time of the conveyance, both Amy and Bill own a property interest in
Blackacre. Amy's property interest is possessory. Bill's property is a
future interest.

63. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigmfor Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109,
138-39 (1995) (creatively noting the policy behind the prohibition against waste should be used as
a standard in the federal trust context). Professor Michael Blumm notes that federal government
created a future interest for itself in Johnson v. M'lntosh when he wrote "the doctrine of discovery
created a kind of split estate, leaving the Indians with a present estate that Marshall called
occupancy title and giving to the discoveror a future interest: a right of preemption in Indian
lands." Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in
Indian County, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 738 (2004). See also Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private
Property Rights on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 187, 227 (2004) (discussing the
Court's protection of future interest holders under the Indian Lands Consolidation Acts over tribal
escheat provisions).
64. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 235 (1984). In fact, in most discussions for future interest, tribes are
passive observers in the dispossession of property rights. See id. Congress may abrogate future
interest in Indian lands granted by earlier statutes. Id. (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1976)).
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It is presumed, as a matter of economic theory, that Amy would have
paid less for a life estate in Blackacre than she would have paid for fee title
in Blackacre. By taking only a life estate, Amy has something less than a
full bundle of property rights. Most notably, Amy's interests in Blackacre
are subject to Bill's future interest.
Although a small handful of tribes are located in geographic areas of
wealth and prosperity, the overwhelming majority of tribes are located in
areas with depressed economies. 65 Economic problems impact all people
within a community, Indian and non-Indians, alike. Non-Indian property
owners who live on or near Indian reservations are often as impoverished as
the tribal citizens. 66 Non-Indians within Indian country are often looking
for financial assistance to pay off consumer debts.67 The media bombards
its audiences with advertisements from businesses that provide home equity
loans, lines of credit, debt consolidation plans and, in serious cases,

65. See Christian C. Bedortha, The House Always Wins: A Look at the Federal
Government's Role in Indian Gaming & The Long Search for Autonomy, 6 SCHOLAR: ST.
MARY'S LAW REVIEW ON MINORITY ISSUES 261 (Spring 2004) (stating,

In fact, many of the Indian lands look more like impoverished third world nations
when viewed in terms of the unemployment, economic depression, and inadequate
housing facilities.
"Unemployment and poverty levels on reservations are
incomprehensible to most Americans, even to those who lived through the Great
Depression and suffered twenty-five to thirty percent unemployment during its
heights.")
(quoting, 138 Cong. Rec. S3,425 (Mar. 12, 1992) (statement from Senator McCain)); Galen
Lemei, Abandoning the PIA Standard: A Comment on Gila V, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235, 262
(Fall 2003) ("These doctrinal principles are bolstered by the practical consideration that Indian
reservations are some of the 'most economically depressed sectors of the nation."') (quoting
Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v.
United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 717 (1997)); Jana L. Walker & Susan M. Williams,
Indian Reserved Water Rights, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 6 (Spring 1991) ("Indian tribes,
whose reservations persist as the most economically depressed areas in the nation, obviously need
the full economic benefit of their water rights from any fair perspective.")
66. See supra note 65. As this article went to print, the United States Supreme Court
clarified the point that merely purchasing the land may not remove state tax obligations. See City
of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 125 S.Ct. 1478, 1493-94 (2005) (holding that
"the doctrine of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility... render inequitable the piecemeal shift in
governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate"). The Court warned that
[i]f OIN may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and remove these parcels from the
local tax rolls, little would prevent it from initiating a new generation of litigation to
free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all
landowners in the area.. .Congress has provided, in 25 U.S.C. § 465, a mechanism for
the acquisition of l?,nds for tribal communities that takes account of the interests of
others with stakes in the area's governance and well being. Section 465 provides the
proper avenue for OIN to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the
Oneidas 200 years ago.
Id. at 1482.
67. John Warren Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling's Destabilization of U.S.
FinancialInstitutions and the Banking Industry: Issues In Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm
Production, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 21 (2002).
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bankruptcy relief. 68 Many of these programs are financed and secured
69
through a second or perhaps third mortgage on real property.
To avoid foreclosure and ensure their possessory rights to property,
many consumers are looking for quick financial solutions with a secondary
concern of long-term financial recovery. Most people who find themselves
in this situation merely want to retain the right to live in their homes. Often
times, these people are not able to take on the payments that are required in
a home equity loan.
Tribes should, with the available capital, offer similar debt-relief
programs to non-Indian consumers who own fee lands within Indian
country. In exchange for a cash loan, the tribe receives a security interest
that provides no immediate return on investment, but looks toward the
future. Consumers would use the tribal loan for the purpose of paying off
consumer debt or delinquent mortgages. The tribe's investment is secured,
not through a second mortgage, but through the creation of a future interest
in the land.
Borrowing from Blackacre, the conveyance could take two forms: (1)
Owner conveys Blackacre to Tribe (or strawman), who then immediately
re-conveys the property to Owner for life; or (2) Owner conveys Blackacre
to Owner for life, remainder to the Tribe.
In the first transaction, at the time of the conveyance, Owner receives a
life estate and the tribe retains a future interest in the land, which will
become possessory at Owner's death. The tribe gains no immediate right to
possess the property, but the tribe acquires a property interest in the land.
Under Anglo-American future interest law, the tribe's future interest will be
70
Owner's life estate is followed by a reversion in
classified as a reversion.
the tribe as the grantor.
In the second transaction, at the time of the conveyance, Owner
receives a life estate and the tribe receives a future interest in the land,
which will become possessory at Owner's death. Like the first scenario, the
tribe gains no immediate right to possess the property, but the tribe,
nonetheless acquires a property interest in the land. Under Anglo-American
future interest law, the tribe's future interest will be classified as a vested
68. See Azmy Baher, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratoriesof Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295 (April 2005) ("Indeed, subprime lenders
often aggressively market home equity loans as debt consolidation products or 'upsell' a borrower
into progressively larger and unnecessary loan products.").
69. Id.; Sokolow, supra note 51, at 91 ("Banks and other lenders will often make a loan to
the owner of a fee simple and use the land as collateral (that is, security) by placing a mortgage
against it.").
70. Future interest are classified as reversions if they are retained or created by the transferor,
in this case, the tribe.
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remainder. 7 1 Owner's life estate is followed by a remainder in the tribe,
since Owner was both the grantor and the life estate holder.
In both scenarios, upon the acquisition of the future interest, the tribe
then petitions the Secretary of Interior to place the property interest in trust
status, rendering the land inalienable. Inalienability protects the land from
adverse possession or the exercise of state eminent domain laws, but most
importantly, preserves the land for the future use of the tribe. Within one
generation, the tribal land base increases significantly. The tribe gains a
future interest in land and the costs are minimal compared to the tribe
purchasing fee title to the lands at market value. The investment returns are
not immediate and tribes will need to administer the lands to ensure the
viability of their future interests.
Critics of this proposal will likely raise questions of whether nonIndian property owners would agree to this type of transaction. Ethical
considerations might also be raised on the grounds that such transactions
border on predatory lending. Although not all property owners would agree
to such transactions, individuals that find themselves in a critical financial
situation will likely see this as a viable option. This proposal is targeted at
individuals that are unable to otherwise obtain affordable financing in the
traditional market. Furthermore, pending amendments to bankruptcy laws,
which make it harder for consumers to obtain relief, might increase the
class of individual property owners that would consider accepting the
tribe's offer.
Property owners that would not be willing to sell their lands outright,
may consider selling a future interest. The downside from the property
owner's perspective is that they would effectively disinherit their children,
but in light of severe economic difficulties, the possibility of remaining in
their homes during their lifetime should be sufficient incentive.
B.

JOINT TENANCIES

Another proposal borrowed from Anglo-American property law is the
creation of joint tenancies. Similar to the proposal for the creation of future
interests, tribes would acquire a present interest as a co-owner with nonIndian fee owners. In exchange for cash, the tribe could acquire a joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship.
The conveyance could take two forms: (1) Owner conveys Blackacre
to Tribe (or strawman), who immediately re-conveys the property to Owner

71. A vested remainder is a future interest in a third party after the expiration of the life
estate. The tribe would be considered a third party because it is not the grantor, nor the life estate
holder.
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and Tribe as Joint Tenants, with the right of survivorship; or (2) Owner
conveys Blackacre to Owner and Tribe, with the right of survivorship. In
both transactions, Owner retains a possessory interest in the land that is then
shared in concurrent ownership with the Tribe. When Owner dies, Owner's
interest will pass to Tribe who will then own the land in fee simple.
The conveyance allows the original owner the right to possess the
whole property. The limitation, in this instance, would be self-imposed by
the tribe. Anglo-American property recognizes and protects the right of coowners to contract between themselves concerning the use of land. In this
scenario, the tribe would contract not to exercise any possessory rights to
the land during the life of the original owner. The tribe's possessory
interest would be invoked only at the time of survival, when the estate
would convert to fee simple title with the tribe as the sole owner.
This option would require more discussion and agreement between the
parties than the proposal for the creation of a future interest following a life
estate. However, there is perhaps another incentive to entice non-Indian fee
owners to consider this option.
The original owner, as a non-Indian owner of fee lands, currently pays
state real estate taxes. 72 Although the tribe might, as a matter of private
contract law, agree not to possess the property, as a matter of property law,
once the tribe becomes a joint tenant, the tribe has a legal right to possess
the whole property. Unlike the future interest proposal, the tribe here
would be viewed as having a possessory right to land. The tribe would then
petition the Secretary to take the land into trust status pursuant to land-intotrust provisions.
The Secretary might be more willing to take the land into trust where
the tribe has a present possessory interest in the land. If the Secretary
exercises authority to place the land in trust, the land becomes inalienable
and immediately protected against state taxation. The non-Indian occupant,
now joint tenant, as a partner with the tribe, no longer pays state taxes.
Over a significant time period, the lack of state income tax on property will
allow the non-Indian to recoup some of the financial costs of agreeing to the
73
joint tenancy.
This is not to say, however, that the Secretary would not also exercise
discretion to extend trust status to the tribe's newly acquired future interest,
in the first proposal. The Secretary has the authority to take "land" into
72. Sokolow, supra note 51, at 70 ("Deeded land is subject to taxation. The vast majority of
land in the United States is deeded land."); id. at 226-27 ("Native Americans can, of course, also
own land in nontrust status, which is taxed by states and local governments and regulated just as is
real estate owned by non-Indians.").
73. Joint tenants do not have the power to devise property at death.
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trust. Federal land-into-trust regulations define "land" broadly to include
"real property or any interest therein."7 4
A future interest is a well-recognized interest in property, and should
therefore be treated in the same manner as a possessory property interest.
The regulations place no other distinction on the type of property interest
that may be held in trust by the federal, government. In fact, the Secretary
already administers life estates and future interests in Indian lands. 75 The
rules that govern life estates and future interests are prescribed by state law,
in absence of a federally-approved tribal law to the contrary. 76
Currently the Secretary administers trust lands which include a wide
variety of different property interests: (1) lands held solely by a tribal
government, on and off the reservation; (2) lands held individually by
multiple Indian co-owners, on and off the reservation; (3) lands held by the
federal government for the benefit of Indian programs; (4) lands held in coownership between the tribe and individual Indians, on reservation. 77 This
variety of property interests in trust lands suggests a broad application that
would entertain various types of ownership interests. The system already
embraces trust status for lands held individually or as co-tenancies.
Extending trust status to lands held in the form of joint tenancies and future
interests in the form of reversions or remainders would be a permissible
Secretarial action given the present diversity of estates. There is simply no
reason, as a matter of property law for the Secretary to deny petitions on the
grounds that the interest is future rather than possessory. The Secretary's

74. 25 C.F.R. §15.2 (2005).
75. 25 C.F.R. Pt. 179 (2005). Indian lands under this provision is defined broadly to include
the land of individual Indians or the property interests of tribes. 25 C.F.R. § 179.2 (2005).
, 76. 25 C.F.R. § 179.3 (2005). Even if tribes are not prepared to enact the proposals set forth
in this article, they should consider tribal code provisions to govern life estates and future interest
of trust lands within their jurisdiction. Otherwise, state law will continue to be applied inside
Indian country. Id.
77. See Yvonne Mattson, Comment, Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Fee Simple Tribal
Lands: Why Congress Is Not Acting Trustworthy, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1063, 1082 (Spring
2004) (stating,
The changes in federal policy resulted in reservation lands being designated as "one or
more of following three types of land tenure: (1) tribally owned land held in trust by
the federal government; (2) allotted lands owned by individual Indians but held in trust
by the federal government; and (3) parcels of property owned in fee simple, usually by
non-Indians, as a result of the Allotment policy.")
quoting Mary C. Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1994)); Sokolow, supra note 51, at 97 (stating,
Today, many non-Indian parcels may be intermingled with parcels owned by a tribe or
its members, either in trust or in deeded status. This checkerboard pattern causes a
great deal of confusion for those trying to determine whether the tribe or the state has
civil or criminal jurisdiction over a given parcel of land within Indian country.)
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primary charge is to take lands into trust in fulfillment of the current federal
policy of tribal self-determination.
IV. RESTORING TRIBAL ECONOMIES AFTER REACQUISITION OF
PROPERTY INTERESTS
Once property interests are acquired, and particularly when those
interests become possessory, tribal economies will rebound quickly,
particularly if tribes are successful in removing state taxation and regulatory
authority. Tribes, with newly acquired property interests and an expanding
land-base will have better opportunities to generate revenues. But before
tribes consider revenue projects, expanding the tribal tax base and economic
development through the promotion of private enterprise, there are
considerations to be made in the management of the newly acquired
property interests.
A.

FEDERAL LAND-INTO-TRUST PROVISIONS

Tribes need to determine whether they would like to petition the
78
At the
Secretary to take the newly acquired property interest into trust.
it is
because
mechanism
this
of
present time, tribes should take advantage
However,
taxation.
the only recognized avenue for freeing lands from state
given the history of mismanagement of tribal assets by the federal
proceed with caution
government, it is understandable that tribes would
79
oversight.
federal
to
lands
their
before subjecting
The federal land acquisition policy promotes the extension of trust
80
In addition, the Secretary is authorized to
status to Indian fee lands.
where the property is located within the
tribe
the
for
lands
acquire trust
81
It is not
exterior boundaries, or adjacent to, an Indian reservation.
is
Secretary
The
lands.
of
necessary for the tribe to be the sole owner
in
permitted to extend trust status when a tribe acquires a fractional interest

78. Tribes initiate a land-into-trust petition pursuant to 25 C.F.R. §151.9 (2005):
An individual Indian or tribe desiring to acquire land in trust status shall file a written
request for approval of such acquisition with the Secretary. The request need not be in
any special form but shall set out the identity of the parties, a description of the land to
be acquired, and other information which would show that the acquisition comes
within the terms of the part.
Id.

79. See discussion of Cobell litigation, supra note 59.
80. 25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (2005). When the tribe already owns the land, as will be the case
under this proposal, the Secretary is authorized to take the land into trust. Id. § 151.3(a)(2), §
151.4.
81. Id. § 151.3(a)(1). The Secretary has broader discretion to acquire lands "necessary to
facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development or Indian housing."
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land. 82 Because the lands in this proposal are located within Indian country,
the requests for trust status receives less departmental scrutiny than if the
lands were located off-reservation.83 Under the provisions, the state and
local government are permitted to provide written comments regarding
potential impacts on their regulatory jurisdiction and property taxes. 84
B.

TRIBAL LAND TRUSTS

Due to mismanagement concerns and the increasing costs of
administering trust lands, there is some disdain for the federal government
to get out of the trust lands business altogether.8 5 Some have advocated that
the federal government convey the trust lands to the tribes, where the tribal
government would hold title for the benefit tribe or individual Indians. 8 6
In the Burning of Blackacre, I suggested that tribes should create and
extend a tribal trust status over lands held in fee by tribal citizens. 87 The
individual Indian co-tenants would convey their land to the tribe and the
tribe would immediately re-convey the beneficial interest back to the tribal
citizen. 88 The legal title would then rest with the tribe as trustee, analogous
to the federal trust lands status. 89
Although these tribal trust lands would likely fall under the
adjudicatory and regulatory authority of the tribe, it is not clear whether
tribal trust lands established through this proposal would be free from state
taxation. Fee lands owned by individual Indians are subject to state real
estate taxes. 90 If the tribe acquired title to these lands and then extended

82. Id. § 151.7 (2005). Acquisition of a fractional interest can be approved by the Secretary
if the buyer already owns a fractional interest in the land or if the interest acquired is in fee. Id. §
151.7(a)-(b).
83. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (2005) (On-reservation acquisitions) with 25 C.F.R. §
151.11 (2005) (Off-reservation acquisitions). The Secretary will consider the tribe's need for
more land, the purposes for which the land will be used, and other tribal and federal
considerations. Id. § 151. 10(a)-(d) and (g). The Secretary will also take into consideration the tax
consequences of the state. Id. § 15 1.10(e). Compliance with federal environmental statutes will
also be taken into consideration. Id. § 151.10(h). For off-reservation acquisitions, all of the
considerations of § 1151.11 apply in addition to two additional considerations: (1) the location of
the land relative to the tribe's reservation with increased scrutiny the further away from the tribe's
Indian country and (2) the economic benefits associated with the land use. Id. § 1151.1 l(b)-(c).
84. Id. § 151.10. The time period for written comments is thirty days, after which the
petitioning tribe is given an opportunity to respond. Id.
85. David Melmer, Morgan Tells BIA: 'Get Out of the Trust Land Business,' INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, (Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://www.indiancountry.com/
content. cfm?id= 1096410563.
86. Id.
87. Leeds, supra note 2, at 497.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S 251,263-64 (1992).
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tribal trust status to the lands, it would not necessarily remove them from
the state tax base.
Interestingly, the concept of tribal trust lands has been contemplated by
9
the federal government, at least in hindsight. 1 The Cherokee Nation
received a fee patent to their lands after being removed from the
southeastern United States. 92 As a prelude to the allotment process, federal
agents in the late 1890s, began exercising control over Cherokee lands for
the approval of leases. 93 When the Cherokee Nation challenged the federal
actions, the federal government retreated by stating that the Cherokee
Nation did not, in fact, hold fee title to its lands, but instead, the tribe held
the land in trust for its citizens:
As we have said, the title to these lands is held by the tribe in trust
for the people. We have shown that this trust is not being properly
executed, nor will it be if left to the Indians, and the question
arises, What is the duty of the government of the United States
with reference to this trust? While we have recognized these tribes
as dependent nations, the government has likewise recognized its
guardianship over the Indians and its obligations to protect them in
94
their property and personal rights.
The federal government, after reclassifying the way in which the Cherokee
Nation held title to the lands, suggested that tribal mismanagement of tribal
95 What resulted, as
trust lands justified federal government intervention.
discussed throughout this article, was the allotment of Cherokee lands and a
full dispossession of Cherokee tribal title.
The Cherokee story is useful on two fronts. First, it evidences that the
96 Second, if the
concept of tribal trust land is not as novel as it appears.
alleged mismanagement of tribal trust funds was a rationale for taking
Cherokee trust title and replacing it with federal oversight, then perhaps the
same rationale applies to abolish the federal trust model in favor of tribal
control. If tribes began establishing tribal trust land offices under the
proposal set forth in The Burning of Blackacre, the existing governmental
infrastructure would be available to readily accept a transfer of federal trust
lands should it become feasible.

91.
(1894)).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 302 (1902) (quoting SEN. REP. NO. 377
Id. at 295.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 302 (quoting SEN. REP. No. 377 (1894)).
Id. at 307.
Leeds, supra note 2, is the first proposal for the creation of tribal trust status.
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CONCLUSION

In Anglo-American property law, or so the metaphor goes, property
rights are akin to a bundle of sticks. A person who owns land in fee retains
the full bundle of rights. The right to exclude is one stick. The right to
possess is another. The are many other sticks. When a person possesses
even one of these sticks, a property interest is born.
Federal Indian law has taught Indian people the importance of the
bundle. In Johnson v. Mclntosh,97 Justice Marshall concluded that Indians
lacked the full bundle of sticks.98 Indian people only had the "right of
occupy" stick. 99 The United States had a bigger stick: the future interest to
acquire the Indian's stick.
Indians learned the hard way that one missing stick can severely
damage the whole bundle. But Indians have also witnessed, through AngloAmerican property laws, that the acquisition of certain sticks can restore the
full bundle of rights. Anglo-American property law offers creative avenues
for the acquisition of property interest. Tribes, while continuing to
revitalize their own property laws, should consider acquiring future
interests or joint tenancies in non-Indian fee lands as a means to reacquire a
portion of the lands lost to allotment. Once property interests are
reestablished, tribal economies will be better situated for economic
recovery.

97. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
98. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592.

99. Id.

